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Indonesia went through a process of fiscal decentralization in 2001 involving the 
devolution of several policymaking and service delivery functions to the subnational 
tiers of government (provinces and districts). This process is likely to have affected 
regional patterns of urbanization, because the new prerogatives granted to the local 
governments have altered the distribution of urban amenities and labour market 
outcomes among and within the local jurisdictions. This paper uses a dataset of local 
governments for 1996 and 2004-05 to estimate the effect of the decentralization of 
minimum-wage setting in 2001 on urban population growth. Our findings suggest that, 
controlling for demand- and supply-side determinants of urban population growth, if the 
minimum wage had risen by an additional 81.5 thousand rupiah (25 per cent of its initial 
mean value), the urban population would have risen by an additional 0.4 per cent from 
its initial level. 
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1 Introduction 
Indonesia went through an ambitious process of fiscal and administrative 
decentralization in 2001, according to which several political, policymaking and service 
delivery functions were transferred to the lower tiers of government. Of particular 
interest was the devolution of minimum-wage setting to the local governments and 
provinces. This process is likely to have affected regional patterns of urbanization, 
because the new prerogatives granted to the local governments, coupled with growing 
political autonomy, have altered the distribution of infrastructure (urban amenities) and 
labour market outcomes among and within the local governments. At about 50 per cent, 
Indonesia’s urbanization rate is in line with the average of low-income countries, but 
there is considerable regional variation within the country in urbanization rates and 
trends. 
Against this background, this paper describes trends in urbanization across the 
Indonesian local jurisdictions and discusses how a particular feature of decentralization 
—minimum-wage setting—is likely to have affected urban population growth and the 
distribution of the local population between cities and rural areas. Theoretical 
motivation is derived from two strands of literature. One is based on the conventional 
models of urbanization, following the tradition of Brueckner (1990), according to which 
urban population growth is driven primarily by differences in income and market 
potential between urban and rural areas. The other is inspired by De Long and Shleifer 
(1993), Ades and Glaeser (1995), Davis and Henderson (2003) and Henderson and 
Wang (2007) and considers the effects of institutions, including federalism and 
democratization, on urbanization and urban concentration. Previous research on the 
effects of fiscal decentralization on urbanization and regional development includes 
Firman (2003). 
Empirical evidence is provided for a dataset of Indonesian local governments 
constructed primarily on the basis of the labour market (Sakernas), household (Susenas) 
and industrial (Survei Industri) surveys. Using the local governments as the units of 
observation, we estimate the effect of decentralization of minimum-wage setting in 
2001 on urban and rural population growth in a reduced-form setting that controls for 
the supply and demand drivers of urbanization. We focus on changes in the relevant 
variables between 1996 and 2004-05,1 a time span that covers the pre- and post-
decentralization periods. We differ from previous empirical literature in two main ways: 
we focus on a cross-section of local governments within a single country, rather than on 
a cross-section of countries, and use household and labour market survey, rather than 
population census, data.  
Our main finding is that, controlling for demand and supply factors, an increase in the 
minimum wage is associated with an increment in the urban population at the district 
level. In particular, controlling for other determinants of urban population growth, if the 
minimum wage had risen by 81.5 thousand rupiah (25 per cent of its initial mean value), 
the urban population would have risen by an additional 0.4 per cent from its initial level.  
                                                 
1   While Sakernas is carried out every year, the consumption/expenditure module of Susenas is available 
every four years. Thus, Sakernas data refer to 2004 and Susenas data to 2005.  2 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 overviews the main features of 
urbanization in Indonesia. Section 3 describes the estimation procedure and the dataset. 
Section 4 presents the estimation results, and Section 5 concludes.  
2  Minimum wage, decentralization and urbanization 
2.1  Urbanization in Indonesia 
Indonesia’s urban population nearly has doubled since 1990 to about 109 million in 
2005, the latest year for which mid-census data are available. The country’s 
urbanization rate is in the neighbourhood of 50 per cent, which is in line with the 
average of low-income countries, and is estimated to rise to nearly 69 per cent in 2030 
(United Nations 2007).  
As in other developing countries, rural/urban migration has been the main engine of city 
growth in Indonesia. The urban population grew by over 4.5 per cent per year on 
average during 1985-05, while the rural population shrank by 0.3 per cent per year on 
average over the same period. Net migration is estimated to have accounted for almost 
60 per cent of urban growth in Indonesia in the 1980s (United Nations 2001). 
Nevertheless, Indonesia’s rural population, although declining, is among the largest in 
the world, at about 117 million in 2005. This suggests ample room for further rural 
emigration to continue to sustain rapid urbanization. 
Of course, population census-based urbanization trends, although illustrative, need to be 
assessed with some caution. For example, they are affected by changes in the 
classification of localities between urban and rural, which is often based on 
administrative criteria that not always reflect differences in economic structure between 
urban and rural areas (Hugo 2003; Firman, Kombaitan and Pradono 2007).2 We go 
some way in addressing this problem by using household and labour market survey 
data. To illustrate these methodological differences, basic urbanization indicators are 
reported in Table 1 for 1996 and 2004, the reference years used in the empirical analysis 
below. 
Table 1 
Urbanization indicators, 1996 and 20040-05, % 
  Sakernas   Population census
a 
  Urban Rural Urban Rural 
1996  42.9 57.1 35.6 64.4 
2004  49.9 51.0 48.1 51.9 
  Note:  a refers to 1995 and 2005 (mid-census years), instead of 1996 and 2004. 
  Source:  Susenas, Sakernas, and United Nations (2007). 
                                                 
2   This is important, because the distinction between urban and rural areas has become increasingly 
blurred, reflecting to a large extent an increasingly complex mix of activities in urban and peri-urban 
areas and along transport corridors connecting large urban centres. In the case of Indonesia, for 
example, this phenomenon is often referred to as kotadesasi (McGee 1991, 1992; Firman 1992; 
Firman, Kombaitan and Pradono 2007). 3 
There is a limited empirical literature on the determinants of urbanization in Indonesia. 
Firman Kombaitan and Pradono (2007) discuss the main determinants of urbanization 
since the 1980s and attribute the concentration of population and economic activity in 
the Jakarta Metropolitan Area (Jabotabek) to the country’s integration into the world 
economy. Firman (1992) uses census data to describe the patterns of urban population 
growth in 82 Javanese predominantly rural districts (kapubaten) during 1980-90, 
excluding Jakarta and the districts that are predominantly urban (kota). Consistent with 
our approach, the unit of observation is the local governments (kabupaten/kota). The 
author reports a trend towards comparatively higher urban population growth in the 
large cities and in their surrounding areas. When discussing the main determinants of 
urban concentration in the metropolitan areas of Jakarta and Bandung, Firman (2003 
and 2009) relates urbanization and fiscal decentralization through the empowerment of 
local governments, which is expected to better tailor the provision of urban amenities 
and infrastructure to local needs. 
2.2  An overview of Indonesia’s decentralization process 
Following the demise of the Suharto regime in 1998, Indonesia launched an ambitious 
fiscal decentralization programme that was implemented from 2001. Decentralization 
allowed for increasing demands for policymaking autonomy at the subnational level to 
be met in a country that is characterized by considerable economic and geographic 
diversity. ‘Big-bang’ decentralization was implemented smoothly,  despite serious 
administrative and capacity constraints at the local level and without serious disruption 
in service delivery. Fiscal and administrative decentralization was taken a step further in 
2004, when direct elections (Pilkada Langsung) were introduced for province governors 
and heads of local governments. 
Decentralization has put the local, rather than the middle-tier, jurisdictions at the 
forefront of service delivery. Several expenditure assignments, especially in the social 
area, were decentralized to the local governments, which now account for almost 
two-thirds of consolidated government spending, nearly double the pre-decentralization 
share. Notwithstanding their increased expenditure assignments, the local governments 
have limited taxing autonomy: income and property tax revenue is collected by the 
centre and transferred to the local governments on a derivation basis. The bulk of local 
government revenue comes from a general allocation grant (DAU, dana alokasi umum), 
followed by the sharing of oil and gas revenue (SDA) and earmarked or conditional 
transfers (DAK, dana alokasi khusus), which are used to finance predominantly capital 
outlays. Own sources account for less than 10 per cent of local government revenue. 
DAU is financed through a fixed share of central government net revenue (currently 26 
per cent), of which 90 per cent is allocated to the local governments and the remainder 
is allocated to the provinces.  
In addition to increasing vertical imbalances, decentralization has exacerbated 
horizontal inequality among the local governments. This is essentially because the 
sharing of revenue from the exploitation of natural resources is limited to the oil- and 
gas-rich provinces. Also, there is limited scope for using DAU as an equalization tool, 
because funds are distributed among the local governments on a derivation basis, rather 
than in relation to estimated fiscal capacity and expenditure needs. Another 
consideration is that, although DAU allocations are intended to be formula-based, they 
are still guided in part by historical budgeting on the basis of pre-decentralization 4 
appropriations for the formerly deconcentrated personnel and assets that have 
subsequently been decentralized to the regional governments (Hofman et al. 2006). 
At the same time, the central government retains control over the regional governments 
in areas related to tax policy (by setting tax bases and ranges for rates), budget making 
(local budgets need to be submitted to and approved by the central government), 
financial management (there are constraints on local government borrowing and debt 
management) and investment programmes, including in devolved sectors, such as 
education, health care and infrastructure development. 
Following decentralization, there was a proliferation of subnational jurisdictions. The 
number of local governments (both kapubaten and kota) rose from 314 in 1998 to 440 at 
end-2005, and five provinces were created over this period, raising their number to 33. 
Legal constraints on the creation of new jurisdictions are lax and incentives for 
fragmentation are strong, given the reliance of local governments on financing from the 
centre, as well as bureaucratic and political rentseeking in some cases (Fitrani, Hofman 
and Kaiser 2005). 
Of particular importance for our empirical analysis is the devolution of minimum-wage 
setting to the subnational governments in 2001.3 The minimum wage is currently 
calculated by the local governments on the basis of an estimated cost-of-living indicator 
and then proposed to the provincial governments by a tri-partite wage council, including 
representatives from labour, government and the private sector. Typically, the provinces 
set the minimum wage at the level proposed by the local governments.4 By contrast, 
prior to decentralization, the minimum wage used to be set nationally by the central 
government on the basis of a different cost-of-living indicator. Following 
decentralization, the minimum wage rose considerably in real terms, especially during 
2000-03, reaching about 65 per cent of the median wage in 2004, a ratio that is far 
higher than the 45 per cent average of the OECD area (OECD 2008; Comola and de 
Mello 2009, 2010). 
2.3  How may decentralization affect urbanization? 
There are several channels through which the devolution of service delivery and 
minimum-wage setting to sub-national governments, coupled with greater political 
autonomy, may affect the supply-demand mix for urbanization.  
First, decentralization has granted the local jurisdictions increasing autonomy to allocate 
their budgetary resources among competing needs. This is despite the fact that several 
expenditure functions are still costed on the basis of historical budget allocations and 
financed through transfers from the centre. Moreover, there is considerable anecdotal 
evidence that capacity constraints in the areas of budget making and expenditure 
management have had a bearing on the ability of local governments to implement 
 
                                                 
3   For more information on minimum-wage setting, see SMERU (2001) and Widartu (2006). See also 
Comola and de Mello (2010) for empirical evidence on the effect of the minimum wage on 
employment and earnings using a multinomial selection model. 
4  Until end-2000, there were different minimum wages within a few provinces (Riau, South Sumatra, 
West Java, East Java and Bali) and for selected sectors of activity. 5 
Table 2 
Infrastructure indicators: Urban and rural areas, 1996 and 2005 
Access rates, in % of households 
 1996    2005 
 rural  urban   rural  urban 
Sources of drinking water             
Piped water  43.9  7.6  6.4  1.0 
Pump 16.5  6.7  37.0  9.8 
Well 34.1  50.8  44.6  40.8 
Spring 2.4  20.8  7.7  27.8 
Other 3.2  14.1  4.4  20.6 
Toilet facilities           
Private 65.7  39.8  72.7  50.8 
Shared 16.0  11.0  15.0  11.1 
Other 18.3  49.2  12.3  38.1 
Source: Susenas. 
infrastructure development projects. Notwithstanding these caveats, urban-rural 
infrastructure differentials have shrank somewhat over time, although there is no clear 
pattern across indicators (Table 2).  
Second, by devolving minimum-wage setting to the districts and provinces, 
decentralization may have resulted in greater wage dispersion across the regions. This is 
important for our empirical analysis. Until 2000, there appears to have been a process of 
gradual reduction in disparities in the value of the minimum wage across jurisdictions, 
with higher real increases in the local governments and provinces where the minimum 
wage had the lowest values (Comola and de Mello 2009). However, decentralization 
seems to have put a halt to this process of minimum-wage convergence (Figure 1). As 
wage is a key determinant of rural-urban migration (both within and across districts), 
the decentralization of minimum-wage setting is likely to have played a role in the 
process of urbanization and to have affected some local governments more than others.  
An important consideration is that minimum-wage provisions apply only to full-time 
regular workers and are not enforced among informal sector workers. This is interesting 
for empirical hypothesis testing, because it can be used as an identification device: 
changes in the minimum wage can be used to identify an effect of decentralization that 
is circumscribed to urban areas. Of course, there are informal sector workers in urban 
areas, but it can be assumed that rural employment is essentially informal. Labour-
market survey (Sakernas) data indeed suggest that over 91 per cent of employment in 
rural areas was informal in 2004, against about 56 per cent in the urban areas (Comola 
and de Mello 2009).5 
                                                 
5   To some extent, earnings in the informal sector are affected by wage-setting in the formal sector, but 
this hypothesis cannot be tested in Indonesia, because the labour-market survey does not report 
information on earnings for informal-sector workers. See Comola and de Mello (2010) for more 
information. 6 
Figure 1 
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Note: 1. The diamonds refer to the minimum wage at the provincial level. Average yearly changes are 
deflated by the GDP deflator. 
Source: Ministry of Manpower and World Bank (WDI). 
3  The estimating strategy  
3.1  The theoretical hypothesis 
There is widespread agreement that the demand for urbanization is driven primarily by 
differences in income and the stock of amenities (adjusted for cost-of-living 
differentials) between cities and rural areas.6 Individuals decide to move to the city in 
                                                 
6   See Brueckner (1990), for example, for a review of the early literature on developing countries; 
Glaeser, Scheinkman and Shleifer (1995) and Black and Henderson (2003) for a more general 7 
search of better job opportunities, and because they believe the quality of life to be 









= ∑ ∑ ≠ ≠
U
















y U U , , , ,




i y  denotes per capita income in jurisdiction i (among the existing N 
jurisdictions) for place of residence k, which can be urban (U) or rural (R); 
k
i A  is the 
stock of amenities in jurisdiction i for place of residence k;  ij τ  is the average distance 
between jurisdictions i and j; and 
U
i P  is the urban population in jurisdiction i, used as a 
scale variable. 
The supply of residents from outside the city also depends on income differentials, the 
stock of amenities in rural areas in the reference jurisdiction and in neighbouring 
jurisdictions (adjusted for distance), and the size of the rural population in the reference 
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i P  is the rural population in jurisdiction i. 




i U U U = = , the size of the urban population in the reference 
jurisdiction can be computed by solving Equations (1) and (2) for 
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We argue that decentralization affects indirectly the demand and supply determinants of 
urbanization through its impact on income through minimum-wage setting. Because of 
non-enforcement of minimum-wage provisions in the rural sector, as discussed above, 
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Equation (4) can be estimated for first-differenced data using the 1996 (before 
decentralization) and 2004/2005 (after decentralization) waves of the survey data used 
to construct our dataset (described below), such that: 
                                                                                                                                               
theoretical model and evidence on the determinants of city growth; and Duranton and Puga (2004) for 
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3.2 Estimating  equation 
Equation (5) is a reduced-form equation relating changes in the size of the urban 
population to changes in the minimum wage. However, its estimation poses a few initial 
methodological challenges. First,  population growth is known to be persistent 
(Rappaport 2004), which affects the error structure of the estimating equation. We deal 
with this problem by including the initial value of the urban and rural populations 
among the regressors. Second, 
R
i P Δ  and 
R
i y Δ , as well as changes in the amenity 
indicators, are most likely endogenous, which would bias the parameter estimates. 
Estimation by IV is difficult, because it would raise the issue of the appropriateness of 
instruments and because overidentification tests perform poorly in the presence of 
persistent errors. Instead, we deal with this problem by replacing the differenced RHS 
variables by their initial values. Finally, we include the initial value of urban income 
among the regressors to control for the initial relative value in the minimum wage, and a 
vector of time-invariant or initial-level controls (including education, population age 
structure, availability of natural resources and location within an extended metropolitan 
area) to account for district-specific characteristics. Equation (5) can therefore be 
estimated as: 
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where v is an error term and subscript 0 indicates initial values. 
3.2 Data 
Our empirical analysis focuses on local governments as the units of observation. We 
expand the dataset constructed by Comola and de Mello (2009) to include local 
government-level indicators of urban and rural income as well as amenities, using 
household survey (Susenas) data. The dataset matches the district-level data available 
from the labour market survey (Sakernas) for 1996 and 2004 taking into account the 
administrative changes that took place over the period, including the creation of new 
jurisdictions. The dataset includes 378 jurisdictions. Our baseline sample includes 215 
local governments for which information is available for all variables of interest and 
where both rural and urban residents are surveyed. 
To measure the stock of urban and rural amenities, we construct a synthetic index using 
the different indicators of access to infrastructure available from Susenas. Of course, 
each indicator could enter the estimating equations as a proxy for the stock of amenities. 
But these indicators are correlated, which makes it difficult to obtain reliable estimates 
of the individual coefficients. In addition, there is no a priori criterion for selecting the 
most appropriate proxies for amenities among the indicators available. Moreover, 
individual indicators may not exhibit sufficient variation between rural and urban areas 
(5) 
(6) 9 
to fully capture rural-urban differentials in the availability of amenities. We therefore 
apply principal component analysis to reduce the number of infrastructure indicators 
available from Susenas into a more manageable, smaller number of ‘dimensions’, while 
preserving the data variability contained in the original indicators. Our synthetic indices 
are defined as the first principal component of the underlying variables. The use of 
synthetic indicators to capture a wide range of amenity measures has been used 
increasingly in the urbanization literature (Gunderson and Ng 2006). 
The synthetic indicators of infrastructure were constructed as follows: first, four raw 
indicators (the shares of households with electric light, private drinking facilities, piped 
or pumped water, and private toilet facilities at home) were computed for rural and 
urban areas separately. Then, for each district we took the first principal components of 
the rural and urban indicators. These first principal components explain 0.47 and 0.53 of 
the rural and urban variances, respectively. They are highly correlated with each 
individual indicator: for instance, the correlation between the indicator for rural 
infrastructures and the four proxies is 0.85, 0.4, 0.29 and 0.21 respectively.  
A detailed description of the variables included in the dataset is presented in the 
Appendix. The dataset’s descriptive statistics are reported in Table 3. 
Table 3 
Descriptive statistics  
Variable N  mean max min s.d.
Growth_urban 262  34.00 8175.00 -2031.00 878.69
Growth_rural 262  -67.76 1180.00 -1288.00 300.52
delta_MW (in rupiah) 262  319072.40 515550.00 182500.00 81544.81
n_urbans96   262  396.18 4395.00 0.00 640.14
n_rurals96   262  522.84 1968.00 0.00 421.87
total_population96   262  919.02 6363.00 51.00 808.70
low_education96   262 62.19 91.15 15.99 16.21
young_population96   262 39.21 53.85 25.25 4.85
urban_income (in rupiah) 237  10021.84 20541.43 4774.34 3044.38
rural_income (in rupiah) 238  6620.56 13954.34 1113.02 1814.93
urban_infrastructure (in units) 260  0.80 1.34 0.23 0.26
rural_infrastructure (in units) 251  0.78 1.54 0.07 0.28
provincial_urban_income (in rupiah) 237  1026979.00 1749539.00 679226.30 197181.50
provincial_rural_income (in rupiah) 238  636939.20 878915.70 487187.80 94595.13
provincial_urban_infrastructure (in units)  260  0.85 1.26 0.39 0.15
provincial_rural_infrastructure (in units)  251  0.74 1.14 0.20 0.19
external_urban_income (in rupiah) 262  31410.52 42563.18 14055.12 8488.71
external_rural_income (in rupiah) 262  17978.01 24566.06 8126.11 4640.33
external_urban_infrastructure (in units)  262  0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01
external_rural_infrastructure (in units)  262  0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01
metropolitan1 262  0.03 1.00 0.00 0.18
metropolitan2 262  0.01 1.00 0.00 0.11
metropolitan3 262  0.02 1.00 0.00 0.14
oil_provinces 262  0.10 1.00 0.00 0.30
squared_urban_income 237  1.10E+12 4.22E+12 2.28E+11 6.94E+11
squared_rural_income 238  4.71E+11 1.95E+12 1.24E+10 2.75E+11
delta_rural_income (in rupiah) 224  640878.20 6906986.00 -485949.10 664148.10
ratio_value_added 125  0.87 10.18 0.01 1.19
Source: Sakernas, Susenas, Statistik Industri and authors’ calculations. 10 
4  The estimation results 
4.1  The baseline model 
The baseline results (estimated by OLS) are reported in Table 4. Model 1 refers to the 
estimation of Equation (6), and the dependent variable is the change in urban population 
(growth_urban). For the sake of comparison, the same regression is estimated in Model 
2 for changes in rural population (growth_rural) as the dependent variable. 
Table 4 
Baseline specification 
(Dep. var.: Change in resident population during 1996-2004) 















































































































Observations 215  215 
R-squared 0.784  0.753 
p values in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 11 
With respect to the covariates, both models include initial rural and urban populations, 
educational attainment and age structure, and the initial mean urban and rural incomes 
in the reference jurisdiction and in the other local governments located in the same 
province (excluding the reference jurisdiction). We also include mean urban and rural 
incomes and infrastructure in all other Indonesian provinces weighted by distance in 
order to proxy for economic conditions in alternative migration destinations. Finally, 
three dummies are included to identify local jurisdictions belonging to the country’s 
main metropolitan areas (Jakarta, Yogyakarta and Surabaya), because, as discussed 
above, the distinction between urban and rural locations is particularly difficult in these 
large metropolitan centres. A dummy variable is also included to identify the local 
governments located in the oil-rich provinces (Aceh, Riau, East Kalimantan, Papua). 
This is to test for the presence of effects on regional development associated with the 
devolution of revenue from the exploitation of natural resources to these regions after 
decentralization.  
The selection of covariates is consistent with the literature. For example, to estimate the 
determinants of city growth in the United States during 1960 and 1990, Glaeser, 
Scheinkman and Shleifer (1995) include various urban characteristics in 1960 among 
the regressors, such as initial population and income, output composition, 
unemployment and the educational attainment of the labour force. They find that urban 
population growth is positively related to initial schooling, negatively related to initial 
unemployment and the initial share of employment in manufacturing. De Mello (2002) 
estimates the determinant of city growth in Brazil during 1985-94 and shows that local 
government spending on social services, including health care, and on 
housing/urbanization, is a powerful determinant of city growth. Da Mata et al. (2007) 
estimate the determinants of city growth in Brazil during 1970 and 2000 and also 
include initial human capital, a proxy for market potential, initial population, change in 
rural population and income among the regressors. They find that urban population 
growth decreases with rural income opportunities and intercity transport costs and 
increases with market potential for goods and labour force quality. 
Estimation of Model 1, where the dependent variable is growth_urban, shows that 
minimum wage has a positive, statistically significant impact on urban population 
growth, as hypothesized. Our findings suggest that, controlling for other determinants of 
urban population growth, if the minimum wage had risen by one standard deviation 
(81.5 thousand rupiah, or 25 per cent of its initial mean value), the urban population 
would have risen by 0.4 per cent from its initial value.  
We also find evidence of mean reversal in urban population growth: initial urban 
population is negatively signed and strongly significant. Urban population also grows 
faster in local jurisdictions with larger rural populations. Moreover, initial rural income 
does not seem to affect urban population growth, while initial urban income is 
significant and positively signed. Initial urban income at the provincial level, excluding 
the reference district (weighted by population in each district within the province), does 
appear to deter urban population growth in the reference district. This suggests that 
districts with rich neighbours tend to urbanize at a slower pace, most probably because 
its residents may be attracted to cities in neighbouring districts. The same applies across 
provinces (adjusted for distance), but the parameter estimate is not statistically 
significant. 12 
As for the pull effects associated with urban amenities, the regression results suggest 
that infrastructure development in rural areas is associated with urban population 
growth in the same district. This might indicate that a minimum level of infrastructure 
development is needed in rural areas to support migration to the cities. Differentials in 
the stock of amenities within the province where the reference district is located, as well 
as across provinces, do not seem to affect urban population growth in the reference 
jurisdiction.  
Finally, two of the three metropolitan-area dummies are positively signed and 
statistically significant, suggesting that urban population growth in the jurisdictions 
located within the Jakarta and Yogyakarta metropolitan areas (metropolitan1 and 
metropolitan2, respectively) indeed grow faster than those outside these urban centres. 
As for the dummy variable identifying the local governments located in the oil/gas-rich 
provinces (oil_provinces), the results suggest the urban population growth has actually 
slowed in these jurisdictions.  
Estimation of Equation (6) using rural population growth as the dependent variable 
(Model 2), confirms the finding that minimum-wage setting does not seem to affect the 
rural population growth, as hypothesized. This finding lends credence to our 
identification hypothesis that minimum-wage setting does not affect the earnings 
distribution of informal sector workers. In addition, the parameter estimates suggest that 
the higher the initial rural population the lower the change in rural population growth. A 
higher stock of urban and rural infrastructure, as well as rural infrastructure in provinces 
other than that where the reference jurisdiction is located, seem to decrease rural 
growth. As for income effects, rural and urban income in the reference jurisdiction do 
not seem to affect rural population growth. The effects of income in neighbouring 
jurisdictions within the same province and across provinces do not show a clear pattern. 
Belonging to the Yogyakarta metropolitan area or the oil/gas-rich provinces is 
associated with lower rural population growth.  
4.2 Robustness  checks 
Table 5 reports the results of robustness checks on the baseline specification (Model 1 
of Table 4), where the dependent variable is the growth of urban population. In order to 
test for the possibility of nonlinear effects in the relationship between urbanization and 
income/decentralization (Davis and Henderson 2003), the square of rural and urban 
income was included among the regressors (Model 1). These variables turned out not to 
be statistically significant at classical levels. The finding is robust to including one 
squared variable at a time. 
We also experimented with including rural population growth and the change in rural 
income during the period 1996-2004 among the regressors (Model 2). It seems that 
neither of these variables captures omitted mechanisms influencing changes in urban 
population. Inclusion of these variables does not change the baseline results in a 
qualitative manner.  
Finally, we added an additional regressor to capture the effect of shifting patterns in 
economic activity between urban and rural areas: the ratio of per capita value added in 
labour-intensive versus non-labour intensive manufacturing firms (Model 3). Labour-
intensive sectors appear to be losing dynamism as a result of competition from 
neighbouring countries, such as Vietnam, in the production and exports of labour-13 
intensive goods, such as garments, textiles and footwear. Because labour-intensive 
industries are located predominantly in urban areas, this loss of dynamism is tantamount 
to an asymmetric shock to the urban economy. The variable ratio_value_added  is 
computed for the manufacturing firms located in each district using industrial survey 
(Survei Industri) data. In any case, the variable does not seem to affect urban population 




(Dep. var.: Change in urban population during 2004-1996) 







































Observations 215  202  106 
R-squared 0.785  0.787  0.840 
p values in parentheses. All other regressors are included. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05. 
5 Conclusions 
This paper contributes to a growing strand of empirical literature on the effects of 
institutions, including federalism, on urbanization. Indonesia went through a major 
fiscal decentralization reform in 2001, which devolved the responsibility of setting the 
minimum wage to the provinces and local governments. We used this feature of the 
Indonesian decentralization experience to test whether or not, and, if so, the extent to 
which, decentralized minimum-wage setting has had a bearing on urban population 
growth through its effects on urban-rural differentials in income and the stock of 
amenities. To do so, we constructed a dataset using information available from 
Indonesia’s labour market, industrial and household surveys and treated the local 
governments as the units of observation. Because minimum-wage provisions are not 
enforced in rural areas, we make the identifying assumption that the change in 
minimum-wage setting brought about by decentralization has affected urban-rural 
income differentials through its impact on urban income. Our main finding is that 
minimum-wage hikes are associated with faster population growth in urban areas, while 
having no impact on the growth of rural population.  14 
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Appendix 
VARIABLE DEFINITION 
Variable code  Source Description 
growth_urban  Sakernas  Urban population in 2004 minus urban population in 
1996 
growth_rural  Sakernas  Rural population in 2004 minus rural population in 
1996 
delta_MW  Sakernas  Minimum wage in 2004 minus minimum wage in 
1996 
n_urbans96  Sakernas  Number of urban respondents in 1996 
n_rurals96  Sakernas  Number of rural respondents in 1996 
low_education96  Sakernas  Percentage of population with no schooling or at 
most primary education in 1996 
young_population96  Sakernas  Percentage of population aged 10-24 in 1996 
urban_income  Susenas  Mean monthly income of urban population in 1996 
(1 unit = 100 rupiah). As Susenas only reports 
household income, household income (which 
includes wage/salary, income from agriculture and 
non-agriculture activities) was divided by the number 
of household members 
rural_income  Susenas  Mean monthly income of rural population in 1996 
(1 unit = 100 rupiah). As Susenas only reports 
household income, household income (which 
includes wage/salary, income from agriculture and 
non-agriculture activities) was divided by the number 
of household members 
urban_infrastructure  Susenas  Index of district-level urban infrastructure in 1996, 
obtained as the principal component of the following 
4 indicators: shares of households with electricity 
(PNL and non-PNL), with private drinking water 
facility, with pipe or pump as a source of drinking 
water, and with private toilet facilities 
rural_infrastructure  Susenas  Index of district-level rural infrastructure in 1996, 
which is the principal component of the following 4 
indicators: shares of households with electricity (PNL 
and non-PNL), with private drinking water facilities, 
with pipe or pump as a source of drinking water, and 
with private toilet facilities 
provincial_urban_income  Susenas Average  urban_income for all districts in the same 
province (excluding the reference district, weighted 
by total population in 1996) 
provincial_rural_income  Susenas Average  rural_income for all districts in the same 
province (excluding the reference district, weighted 
by total population in 1996) 
provincial_urban_infrastructure  Susenas Average  urban_infrastructure for all districts in the 
same province (excluding the reference district, 
weighted by total population in 1996) 
provincial_rural_infrastructure  Susenas Average  rural_infrastructure for all districts in the 
same province (excluding the reference district, 
weighted by total population in 1996) 
continues 17 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS (con’t) 
Variable code  Source Description 
external_urban_income  Susenas  Indicator of 1996 urban income in all provinces 
(excluding the reference province, weighted by total 
population in 1996), computed in the following way: 
first, for each province mean urban_income over all 
districts is computed (1 unit = 1 rupiah), with weight 
equal to the total district population in 1996. Then, 
for each province p we computed the sum of all 
other provinces’ mean urban_income dividing each 
term of the sum by the geographical distance (in km) 
between the capital of province p and the capital of 
the province whose income is represented. All 
districts in the same provinces have the same value 
of external_urban_income 
external_rural_income  Susenas  Rural income in 1996 in all other provinces by 
geographical vicinity, computed with the same 
procedure as external_urban_income 
external_urban_infrastructure  Susenas  Urban infrastructure in 1996 in all other provinces by 
geographical vicinity, computed with the same 
procedure as external_urban_income 
external_rural_infrastructure  Susenas  Rural infrastructure in 1996 all other provinces by 
geographical vicinity, computed with the same 
procedure as external_urban_income 
metropolitan1  Sakernas  Dummy equal to 1 for the entire province of DKI 
Jakarta, and the districts of Bogor, Bekasi, 
Karawang and Purwakarta in the province of Jawa 
Barat, and 0 otherwise 
metropolitan2  Sakernas  Dummy equal to 1 for the districts of Bantul, Sleman 
and Yogyakarta in the province of DI Yogyakarta, 
and 0 otherwise 
metropolitan3  Sakernas  Dummy equal to 1 for the districts of Malang, 
Sidoarjo, Jombang, Gresik and Surabaya in the 
province of Jawa Timur, and 0 otherwise 
oil_provinces  Sakernas  Dummy equal to 1 for the districts in the provinces of 
Aceh, Riau, East Kalimantan and Papua, and 0 
otherwise 
squared_urban_income  Susenas  urban_income*urban_income 
squared_rural_income  Susenas  rural_income*rural_income 
delta_rural_income  Susenas  Rural income in 2004 minus rural income in 1996 
ratio_value_added  SI  Ratio of mean value added per worker in textiles, 
clothing and footwear to mean value added per 
worker in all other manufacturing sectors in each 
district  
 